It lists the criticisms, misconceptions and ordinary "gripes" which American troops in Europe express most frequently when they talk about the French. Each comment, or question, is followed by an answer -- or discussion. Some of the answers are quite short, because the question is direct and simple. Some of the answers are quite long, because the "questions" are not questions at all, but indictments which contain complicated and sweeping preconceptions. The purpose of the present publication is to present facts and judgments which even the well-intentioned may tend to overlook. There may be those who will consider this booklet a catalogue of (( excuses )) or (( justifications )). To them it can only be said that the truth is not denied by giving it a derogatory label. There may be others who will seize upon the questions with triumph - ignoring the discussions entirely. That kind of reader will ignore the truth anyway - in whatever form it is offered. This booklet may not convince those who are hopelessly prejudiced, but it may help to keep others from being infected by the same lamentable virus.

1. "We came to Europe twice in twenty-five years to save the French."

We didn't come to Europe to save the  French, either in 1917 or in 1944. We didn't come to  Europe to do anyone any favors. We came to Europe because we in America were threatened by a hostile, aggressive and very dangerous power. In this war, France fell in June of 1940. We didn't invade Europe until June of 1944. We didn't even think of "saving the French" through military action until after Pearl Harbor - after the Germans declared war on us. We came to Europe, in two wars, because it was better to fight our enemy in Europe than in America. Would it have been smarter to fight the Battle of the Bulge in Ohio? Would it have been smarter if D-Day had meant a hop across the Atlantic Ocean, instead of the English Channel, in order to get at an enemy sending rocket bombs into our homes? Would it have been smart to wait in America until V bombs, buzz bombs, rocket bombs, and - perhaps - atomic bombs had made shambles of our cities? Even the kids in Germany sang this song: "Today Germany, tomorrow the world." We were a part of that world. We were marked for conquest. When France fell, our last defense on the Continent was gone.  France was the "keystone of freedom" on land from the Mediterranean to the North Sea; it was a bulwark against German aggression. France guarded the Atlantic, and the bases the Germans needed on the Atlantic for submarine and air warfare. American security and American foreign policy have always rested on this hard fact: we cannot permit a hostile power on the Atlantic Ocean. We can not be secure if we are threatened on the Atlantic. That's why we went to war in 1917; that's why we had to fight in 1944. And that's why, as a matter of common sense and the national interest, President Roosevelt declared (November 11, 1941): "The defense of any territory under the control of the French Volunteer Forces (the Free French) is vital to the defense of the United States."

2. At first, when we came into Normandy, and then into Paris, the French gave us everything - wine, cheese, fruit, everything. They threw their arms around us and kissed us every time we turned around. They gave us the biggest welcome you ever saw. But they've forgotten. They're ungrateful."

Perhaps the French ran out of wine, cheese, fruit and cognac to pass out free. Perhaps the French depleted the stocks they had hidden in their cellars from the Germans. We Could not a Frenchman who read the question above ask, "Are the Americans so ungrateful? Have they so soon forgotten how much we gave them from what little we had?"

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