WMD REPORT: KEY POINTS. THE TRUTH AND THE LIES

The Iraq Survey Group has concluded that Iraq's weapons of mass destruction were "essentially" destroyed in 1991, but that Saddam Hussein wanted to recreate them after sanctions were removed. Below are the key findings of the report.

SADDAM HUSSEIN'S GOALS: 1-Saddam Hussein's goal was evading and ultimately ending UN sanctions that severely restricted what he could import into Iraq. The UN oil-for-food programme gave the Iraqi economy a much-needed boost, but not enough to let him re-start a weapons of mass destruction programme. 2-Once he could restart those programmes, his intention was to focus on chemical weapons for use on the battlefield, long-range missiles, and nuclear weapons. 3-His motivation for developing these weapons was his enmity with Iran, with which Iraq fought an eight-year war in the 1980s. His secondary goals were to oppose Israel and raise his status in the Arab world. The report does not suggest he sought the weapons to oppose the US or to give weapons to terrorists. 4- Saddam Hussein's belief in the value of WMD was shaped from his experiences in the 1980s and early 1990s. He believed that during the 1991 Gulf War, WMD had deterred US-led forces from pressing their attack beyond the goal of freeing Kuwait

NUCLEAR WEAPONS: 1-Saddam Hussein ended his nuclear programme in 1991, after the Gulf War, and there was no evidence to suggest concerted efforts to restart it. Senior Iraqi officials believed Saddam would restart a nuclear programme if UN sanctions imposed after the end of the Gulf War were halted. 2-Baghdad undertook a variety of measures to conceal key elements of its nuclear programme from successive UN inspectors, including specific directions from Saddam Hussein to hide and preserve documents. 3-There were at least two instances in which scientists involved in uranium enrichment kept documents and technology. Although apparently acting alone, they did so with the belief and anticipation of resuming uranium enrichment efforts in the future. 4-The regime prevented scientists from the former nuclear programme from either leaving their jobs or Iraq. In the late 1990s key personnel were given significant pay rises in a bid to retain them. The regime also undertook new investments in university research to ensure that Iraq retained technical knowledge.

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS: 1-Baghdad abandoned its biological weapons programme in late 1995 out of fear it would be discovered. Such a discovery would have made it harder for Iraq to free itself of UN sanctions. 2-There was no evidence of any biological weapons work after 1996, and Saddam expressed no interest in biological weapons after that time. 3-Iraq appears to have destroyed its hidden biological weapons stocks in 1991 and 1992. However, it kept a few samples that would have been useful in starting a biological weapons programme, and it had a group of scientists knowledgeable about such weapons. 4-No evidence was uncovered that Iraq had biological weapons production systems mounted on trucks or rail cars.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS: 1-Iraq unilaterally destroyed its hidden chemical weapons stockpile in 1991, and there is no credible evidence that Iraq ever resumed producing such weapons. 2-However, Saddam Hussein never abandoned his intentions to resume efforts in chemical weapons when UN sanctions were lifted and conditions were judged favourable. 3-The regime organised its chemical industry after the mid-1990s to allow it to conserve the knowledge-base needed to re-start a chemical weapons programme. 4-One of Saddam's sons, Uday, tried to obtain chemical weapons for use during the US-led invasion in 2003, but there is no evidence he came into possession of any.

THREE DIFFERENT GROUPS CLAIM EGYPT'S BLASTS
 

JERUSALEM, Israel- Three previously unknown groups, including one reportedly linked to al-Qaida, published separate claims of responsibility for the deadly car bombings at two Egyptian resorts crowded with Israeli tourists. The Palestinian militant group Hamas denied involvement. The claims by the three groups could not be confirmed. Israel's military intelligence chief, Maj. Gen. Aharon Zeevi-Farkashi, told an emergency Cabinet meeting Friday that al-Qaida was most likely behind the attacks. Deputy Defense Minister Zeev Boim cautioned that very little was known about the attackers but added that al-Qaida was the most likely suspect. Hours after the blasts at the Taba Hilton and the resort of Ras Shitan in the Sinai Peninsula, no established groups had claimed responsibility. Tawhid Islamic Brigades published a claim on a Web site that has been used frequently for such claims from Saudi Arabia and Iraq. And Jamaa Al-Islamiya Al-Alamiya, or World Islamist Group, called an international news agency in Jerusalem. A third group that called itself the "Brigades of the Martyr Abdullah Azzam, al-Qaida, in the Levant Egypt," posted a claim on an Islamic Web site known for running messages purportedly from the al-Qaida terror network. The claim described the attacks as a message to Palestinians and Muslims everywhere, and the Israeli government and people. A month ago, Israeli security officials had published an unusual warning that Israeli tourists should stay away from the Sinai because of concrete signs that terrorists were planning an attack there. However, Israeli travelers largely ignored the warning, and thousands spent the weeklong Jewish holiday of Sukkot, which ended Thursday, at Red Sea resorts, including the Taba Hilton. In the Gaza Strip, a spokesman for the Islamic militant group Hamas denied involvement. "Our firm stand, our firm position is that the battle is within the occupied lands (West Bank and Gaza Strip), and this stand remains the same and has not changed," Hamas spokesman Mushir al-Masri told The Associated Press. Since its founding in 1987, the Islamic militant group, which opposes the existence of Israel, killed hundreds of Israelis in suicide bombings but has refrained from carrying out attacks abroad. Hamas leaders have repeatedly said their conflict is with Israel, and that they do not want to export it. Last month, after a Hamas leader based in Syria was killed by an Israeli car bomb, some Hamas officials said they would now change their policy and target Israelis abroad. However, more senior leaders quickly stepped in and emphasized there was no change in position. Palestinian militants have an interest in staying on good terms with the Egyptians, who are mediating Israel's planned withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in 2005. Militant groups have been holding meetings in Cairo to work out an agreement with the Palestinian Authority on power-sharing after an Israeli withdrawal. AP/RAMI PLUSHNICK-MATI